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 In an astonishing feat, the statistician Nate Silver accurately predicted the outcome of all 
50 states in the 2012 presidential election.  While this is certainly an amazing achievement, 
Silver’s prediction explained nothing about the determinants of the electoral outcome.  Because 
Silver strictly utilized poll data to make his predictions, the only lesson learned was that polls, 
when used properly and formulated into a complex methodology, can offer accurate predictions 
of an election winner.  This method satisfies the craving to know which candidate is going to win 
and by how much, but is silent on the reasons behind voter decisions.  Nate Silver’s predictions 
exemplify the first of two election forecasting goals: prediction.  However, useful election 
forecasting models should also be able to explain, at least in part, electoral outcomes.  The goal 
of this paper is to develop a model than can explain electoral outcomes and contribute to the 
existing theory of voter behavior.  
 Election forecasting serves several unique purposes in the academic and practical realms.  
The development of forecasting models allows political scientists to empirically test their 
theories of voter behavior (Lewis-Beck 2005).  Models provide information to academics about 
the determinants of electoral outcomes and the relative strength of factors influencing voter 
behavior.  More practically, forecasting models provide information to political leaders and 
candidates about the context in which campaigns are set.  Understanding the economic and 
political context of a particular campaign allows candidates to develop better campaign strategies 
and maximize their available resources.  For outside interest groups, forecasting may provide 
information about the viability of particular strategies and policy prescriptions during specific 
election periods (Lewis-Beck 2005).  Lastly, forecasting models satisfy the innate curiosity of all 
election observers regarding the likely winner of an election. 
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 The development of empirical forecasting models began relatively recently in the 1980s.  
Prior to the development of scientific efforts, the Gallup organization began its pre-election polls 
in 1936, but its credibility was not firmly established until the 1950s and 1960s (Lewis-Beck 
2005).  Astute observers of history will be reminded of Gallup’s infamous prediction (as well as 
the picture of President Truman the morning after the election holding a newspaper proclaiming 
his defeat) of a Dewey victory in the 1948 election.  In 1983, Brody and Sigelman developed a 
statistical model that utilized the Gallup presidential approval poll to predict election results 
(Abramowitz 1988).  The famous political scientist and election guru James Campbell developed 
a model that included Gallup trial-heat polls as well as macroeconomic variables in 1990 
(Campbell 1990).  Empirical models have grown in number and accuracy over the years.  The 
Campbell model and other significant models will be explored in the Literature Review section.   
 Considering the very small number of sample observations available, the existing election 
forecasting models have been surprisingly accurate.  Several of the models routinely predict the 
percentage of the popular vote for the incumbent party within a few percentage points accuracy.  
Nonetheless, the models do have their occasional blips in accuracy, and when this occurs, nearly 
all the models offer the wrong prediction.  The 2000 election is the most demonstrative case of 
this modeling failure.  Almost every model in existence overestimated the percentage of the 
popular vote for Gore (Abramowitz 2000).  An attractive explanation for this failure is the 
influence of the campaign.  Al Gore ran a very prospective campaign, instead of retrospectively 
emphasizing the economic growth of the Clinton administration.  In distancing himself from the 
Clinton successes, Gore may have lost many “referendum” voters.  Because most models assume 
the impact of the campaign to be minimal, these same models were unable to pick up on this 




  There is a rich literature of election forecasting, mostly by political scientists instead of 
econometricians.  Almost all of the forecasting models in existence include some sort of 
macroeconomic variable (GDP or GNP) and political variable (incumbency or war).  As 
discussed above, the underlying assumption of most of these models is that the impact of the 
campaign is minimal and most voters are retrospectively oriented in their voting decisions.  One 
of the most interesting contributions to the literature is the “Time for Change” model developed 
by Abramowitz.  With this model, the most important issue at stake in the election is assumed to 
be the choice of the electorate to continue or discontinue the policies of the incumbent party.  
The model employs three variables: presidential popularity (as measured by Gallup), change in 
GNP from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the election year, and a 
dummy incumbency variable that takes the value of 0 if the incumbent party has controlled the 
presidency for one term and 1 if more than one term (Abramowitz 1988).  Abramowitz finds a 
four percentage point penalty for the incumbent party that controls the presidency for more than 
two terms; in effect, voters decide it is “time for a change” (Abramowitz 1988). 
 Just like the “Time for Change” model, most models also include a measure of 
presidential approval.  Erikson and Wlezien utilize the index of leading economic indicators and 
presidential trial-heat polls (Erikson and Wlezien 2004).  Campbell’s “Trial-Heat and Economy” 
model uses the incumbent party support in the Labor Day Gallup poll as well as the growth of 
real GDP in the second quarter of the election year.  Campbell theorizes that the electorate 
assigns half the credit (or blame) to successor candidates of the incumbent party, so GDP growth 
is halved for candidates of the incumbent party who are not sitting presidents (Campbell 2004).  
The “Jobs” model of Lewis-Beck and Tien incorporates the first Gallup measure of presidential 
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popularity in July and an interaction variable that multiplies the growth rate of real GNP in the 
first half of the election year by a dummy variable determined by whether the incumbent 
president is running (1) or not (0).  Additionally, in the case of vacant seat elections, the model 
incorporates another dummy variable that assigns different values based on the relationship 
between the successor candidate and the incumbent president.  Finally, the model uses the total 
growth of jobs in the first 3.5 years of the term (Lewis-Beck and Tien 2004). 
 Two other models incorporate a measure of personal finances as a substitute for general 
macroeconomic variables.  Holbrook incorporates the aggregate personal finances index in May 
of the election year as well as the Gallup measure of presidential approval in the second quarter 
of the election year (Holbrook 2004).  The model developed by Lockerbie uses an interesting 
prospective-based approach, instead of the retrospective approach taken by the majority of the 
other models.  Lockerbie includes a measure of prospective personal finances (from the Index of 
Consumer Sentiment in the Michigan Survey of Consumers) over the next year in the first 
quarter of the election year as well as a dummy variable similar to the “Time for Change” model 
(Lockerbie 2004).  The model by Norpoth is innovative in that it utilizes primary election results 
as a predictor of the general election.  This model uses three independent variables: incumbent 
party and opposition party primary support, a cyclical vote variable, and a partisan baseline 
variable.  The results of the model indicate that the effect of primary support for the candidate of 
the incumbent party is much more important than for the opposition candidate (Norpoth 2004). 
 These models, although many of which are innovative and provide interesting 
contributions to election theory, differ from the model I will develop in significant respects.  
Almost all of the models utilize national-level observations of their variables.  Unfortunately, 
data constraints force these scholars to be content with 11 or 12 observations.  Norpoth’s primary 
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support model does manage to gain 23 observations, more than any other model in the literature 
(Norpoth 2004).  To improve the explanatory power of the model, I use state-level measures of 
the variables, which allows the number of observations to expand to 81.  While not large, this 
difference in sample size is significant.  Additionally, I utilize per capita disposable personal 
income and inflation, neither of which appear in any known models in the literature.  Finally, I 
do take a page from Abramowitz’s “Time for Change” model and include an incumbency 
dummy variable that mimics the theory of voter punishment after two or more terms.  
Model 
 To better facilitate the discussion of results in the next section, I will include both my 
initial and final model here.  My initial model takes this form: 
YIncumbent vote = β1+β2GDPterm+β3GDP2year+β4URterm+β5URelect+β6DPIterm+β7DPI2year+ 
β8Incumb 
My final model takes this form: 
YIncumbent vote = β1+β2DPI2year+β3DPI2yearXInf+β4Incumb 
The dependent variable in both models is the percentage of the popular vote obtained by the 
incumbent party in each election.  Data for the dependent variable was obtained from the 
American Presidency project, which maintains a state-by-state database of the results of every 
presidential election.  Both models include a mix of economic and political variables that seek to 
explain the significance of determinants of electoral outcomes in quantitative terms.  Hypotheses 
and descriptions for the variables included in both models are discussed below. 
 GDPterm is the percentage change in real GDP (not compounded) over the four-year 
term.  The value was calculated taking the simple percentage change between the level of real 
GDP at the state-level in the election year and the level of real GDP in the first year of the term.  
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Data for real GDP was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Accounts.  For 
the period from 1977-1997, GDP was chained to 1997 dollars.  For the period from 1997-2012, 
GDP was chained in 2005 dollars.  This discrepancy required an adjustment which was 
accomplished by dividing each state’s GDP values in the 1997-2012 period by the ratio of the 
value of real GDP in the state in 1997 (chained 2005 dollars) to the same value in chained 1997 
dollars.   All else equal, I hypothesize that the impact of GDPterm will be positive.  GDPterm 
reflects economic success throughout the entirety of the term, and greater economic success 
should be rewarded by the electorate.  Similar to GDPterm is GDP2year, which is the simple 
percentage change in real GDP between the election year and the year prior.  All else equal, I 
hypothesize that the impact of GDP2year should be positive and greater than that of GDPterm.  
Election theory in political science regards voter memory as relatively short-term, so voters 
should factor in recent economic performance more strongly that past performance. 
 UR term is the difference in the unemployment rate at the state-level between the first 
quarter of the term and the third quarter of the election year.  URelect is the difference in the 
unemployment rate at the state level between the fourth quarter of the year prior to the election 
year and the rate in the third quarter of the election year.  Unlike real GDP, which is only 
available annually at the state level, unemployment data is available quarterly.  This allows 
URelect to be a more accurate representation of labor market conditions in the election year.  
Data for these two variables was obtained via FRED (St. Louis Federal Reserve).  All else equal, 
the coefficient of URterm should be negative; a rise in the unemployment rate throughout the 
term signifies deteriorating labor market conditions, and voters should punish the incumbent 
party.  All else equal, the coefficient of URelect should be negative and stronger than URterm, as 
voters should again factor in recent performance more so than past performance.   
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 DPIterm is the simple percentage change at the state-level between per capita disposable 
personal income (in nominal terms) in the first year of the term and the election year.  DPI2year 
is the simple percentage change at the state-level between per capita disposable personal income 
(in nominal terms) in the year prior to the election year and the election year.  DPI2yearINF is an 
interaction variable that is calculated by multiplying the DPI2year by the simple difference in the 
national inflation rate between the fourth quarter of the year prior to the election year and the 
third quarter of the election year (INF).  Data for the DPI variables is only available annually and 
was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Data for inflation was obtained as CPI 
from FRED and then converted into inflation rates by taking simple percentage changes.  All else 
equal, DPIterm should have a positive coefficient; a rise in personal income signifies 
improvement in an individual’s personal financial situation, and voters should reward the 
incumbent party for an increase in income over the term.  All else equal, DPI2year should also 
have a positive coefficient and be stronger than DPIterm, as individuals factor recent 
performance more so than past performance into their voting decision.  DPI2yearINF should 
have a negative coefficient.  The impact of inflation on the marginal impact of DPI2year on vote 
should be negative; holding constant nominal income, a rise in the inflation rate will reduce the 
individual’s real income and lead to punishment for the incumbent party. 
 Unlike the previous variables, the last variable to be explored, Incumb, is a political 
variable in nature.  Borrowing from Abramowitz’s “Time for Change” model, this variable is a 
dummy variable that seeks to measure the impact of a party holding the White House for two 
terms or more (Abramowitz 1988).  The variable takes the value 0 if the incumbent party has 
held the White House for one term and takes the value 1 if the incumbent party has held the 
White House for two terms or more.  All else equal, I hypothesize that the coefficient on the 
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variable will be negative.  The idea is that voters grow tired of the policies of a particular party 
after a certain time period (two terms), and consequently the candidate of the incumbent party 
will receive electoral punishment after two terms (Abramowitz 1988).  The interpretation of this 
variable is slightly different; the coefficient can be interpreted as a parallel shift of the regression 
line downward by the amount of the variable coefficient.  Data for this variable was obtained 
from the American Presidency Project.              
 Before examining the results of my regressions, a note on the functional form of the 
model, as well as the states and years examined, is helpful.  The states are Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, and West Virginia.  Each of these 
states was picked with the criteria that they have changed their vote for political party at least 
three times in presidential elections since 1980.  These states are “swing states,” and it is hoped 
that in the absence of national observations, these states provide a reasonable representation of 
the national competitiveness.  The range of years is between 1980 and 2012, constrained only by 
the availability of state-level economic data.  The functional forms of the initial and final model 
are both linear, and I think it unlikely that another functional form is more appropriate.  The only 
other possible functional form would be one that takes into account the possibility of diminishing 
returns to economic performance, but I am skeptical that these diminishing returns exist.  There 
is no rationale that suggests voters might taper their opinions of the incumbent party if the 
incumbent party provided too much economic success.  In most of the elections following 
sizable economic growth, the results have been strongly one-sided (1984 is a good example).  
Even if there are diminishing returns, it is unlikely that it would be displayed in a small sample 
size (there are nine observations per state).  Results from a RESET test, which will be discussed 




 Before proceeding with a discussion of the results of my initial model, it is useful to 
examine the results from a model crafted from state level data (and more observations) that most 
closely mirrors the “Time for Change” model.  This model has been among the most accurate at 
predicting the percentage of incumbent popular vote obtained, beating out almost all other 
models in its error in the 2000 election (Abramowitz 2000).  Because state-level data is only 
available annually (and not quarterly), my approximation of this model takes this form and the 
results are pictured below: 
YIncumbent vote = β1+β2GDP2year+β3Incumb   
The first observation is that incumbency is insignificant even at the 10% level, which refutes the 
most basic point of the model.  The base hypothesis of the model is that voters will punish the 
incumbent party after two terms in office, yet this variable is insignificant in this model.  Part of 
this difference may be due to the change in sample set, but it is difficult to justify this hypothesis 
when the new sample set includes nearly 70 additional observations.  Additionally, the 
coefficient on incumbency (while not significant), is less than Abramowitz’s negative four 
percentage points (Abramowitz 1988).  GDP2year is significant and positive at the 5% level.  
                                                                              
       _cons      47.0397   1.608244    29.25   0.000     43.83793    50.24147
      Incumb    -2.851195   1.831708    -1.56   0.124    -6.497845    .7954555
    GDP2year     .6851673   .2699465     2.54   0.013     .1477452    1.222589
                                                                              
        Vote        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5823.96543    80  72.7995679           Root MSE      =   8.142
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0894
    Residual    5170.80239    78  66.2923383           R-squared     =  0.1122
       Model    653.163045     2  326.581523           Prob > F      =  0.0097
                                                       F(  2,    78) =    4.93
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      81
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The value of the constant is about what is expected at 47.0397; in a two-party system, one party 
should start with a base of support at around 50% of the electorate.  Adjusted R2 only reaches 
0.0894, which suggests that the goodness of fit of this model needs work.  The AIC and BIC of 
this model are 572.5311 and 579.7144, respectively.  A RESET test (see Fig. 1 in appendix) 
conducted with yhat^2 fitted values yielded a p-value on yhat^2 of .057.  At the 10% level, this 
suggests that another functional form is appropriate or a key variable is omitted.  Clearly, this 
model is not adequate given this particular sample set. 
   My initial model includes six measures of economic performance as well as 
incumbency.  The idea behind the model is to capture a diversified view of economic 
performance as well as the impact of incumbency, and to evaluate the relative importance of the 
measures of economic performance to the electorate.  The results of the model are below: 
 Incumbency is significant and negative at the 5% level, as is DPIterm.  DPI2year is 
significant and positive at the 10% level, which is not a problem with smaller data sets.  The 
constant is significant and about what is expected at 51.54439.  All other variables are wildly 
                                                                              
       _cons     51.54439   2.672466    19.29   0.000     46.21817    56.87061
    DPI2year     1.591379   .9348969     1.70   0.093    -.2718674    3.454626
     DPIterm     -.705419   .3465045    -2.04   0.045    -1.396001   -.0148366
      URelec    -.6199566   1.479449    -0.42   0.676    -3.568495    2.328582
      URterm     .0124638   .5956056     0.02   0.983    -1.174576    1.199504
    GDP2year    -.0014048   .5743296    -0.00   0.998    -1.146042    1.143233
     GDPterm     .1561328   .2087622     0.75   0.457    -.2599297    .5721952
      Incumb    -4.334253   1.973471    -2.20   0.031    -8.267375   -.4011313
                                                                              
        Vote        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5823.96543    80  72.7995679           Root MSE      =  7.9736
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1267
    Residual    4641.16722    73  63.5776331           R-squared     =  0.2031
       Model    1182.79822     7  168.971174           Prob > F      =  0.0166
                                                       F(  7,    73) =    2.66
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      81
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insignificant.  A quick F-test on the coefficients of GDPterm, GDP2year, URterm, and URelec 
reveals a p-value of 0.6673, and we fail to reject the hypothesis that these coefficients are zero.  
What is most surprising is the negative coefficient on the DPIterm variable, which indicates that 
as the growth of personal income over the term increases, the electorate punishes the incumbent 
party.  While at first counterintuitive, upon reflection this result makes sense.  This result 
suggests that as growth in income increases throughout the term, the growth of income in the two 
years prior to the election appears less impressive to the electorate.  Income growth may be 
strong in years three and four, but if income growth is equally strong or stronger in the first and 
second years (as it would have to be if growth is strong throughout the term), performance in the 
third and fourth years appears less impressive.   
While this explains the negative coefficient on the DPIterm, there is also another possible 
explanation.  A look at the actual vote plotted against the DPIterm variable (Figure 2) reveals the 
presence of several outliers that may be driving the negative coefficient on the variable.  A closer 
look reveals that these outliers all belong to the 1980 election, in which the vote received by the 
incumbent president (Jimmy Carter) was quite low while DPIterm was actually quite high (30-
40%).  An obvious explanation for these outliers is the presence of another variable not in the 
model that is strongly driving the 1980 results.  Throughout Carter’s term, inflation rates were 
persistently high and economic growth was stagnant, leading to the coining of “stagflation.”  I 
hypothesize that inflation may be strongly driving the relationship in 1980, and that inflation will 
need to be included in another form of the model.  When inflation is included, it should have a 
negative coefficient, reflecting the adverse effect of inflation on the nominal values of incomes.      
However, before exploring the impact of inflation on the expected share of the popular 
vote obtained by the incumbent party, it is interesting to further explore the relationship between 
13 
 
the growth of income in the first two years of the term compared to the last two years.  I regress 
vote against incumbency, DPI2year, and a new variable entitled DPI12, which is the simple 
percentage change in per capita disposable personal income between the first and second years of 
the term.  I hypothesize that the coefficient on DPI12 will be negative, reflecting the theory that 
as growth increases in the first two years of the term, growth in the last two years appears less 
impressive, and voters (taking into account recent performance more strongly than past) punish 
the incumbent party.  The results of the regression are displayed below: 
 Incumbency and DPI2year are significant at the 10% level, while DPI12 is significant at 
the 5% level.  The coefficient on DPI12 is negative, which lends credence to the theory that as 
income growth increases during the first two years of the term, income growth in years three and 
four of the term appears less impressive.  The -1.223103 coefficient on DPI12 indicates that for 
every one percentage point increase in the growth of per capita disposable personal income in the 
first two years of the term, the results in the second half of the term appear less impressive and 
the electorate punishes the incumbent party by 1.22 percentage points.  Clearly, if the incumbent 
party could choose between economic performance at the beginning of the term and performance 
at the end, it should opt for stronger performance in the last two years.  Nevertheless, this model 
                                                                              
       _cons     51.68063   2.391275    21.61   0.000     46.91899    56.44226
      Incumb    -3.290683   1.837876    -1.79   0.077    -6.950362     .368997
       DPI12    -1.223103   .3948293    -3.10   0.003    -2.009308   -.4368972
    DPI2year     .7504806   .3999564     1.88   0.064    -.0459343    1.546896
                                                                              
        Vote        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5823.96543    80  72.7995679           Root MSE      =  8.0375
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1126
    Residual    4974.30444    77  64.6013563           R-squared     =  0.1459
       Model    849.660995     3  283.220332           Prob > F      =  0.0067
                                                       F(  3,    77) =    4.38
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      81
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has problems: it only yields an adjusted R2 of 0.0875 and its AIC and BIC are 572.697 and 
579.8804, respectively.  These values are slightly worse than even the approximation of the 
“Time for Change” model, which suggests a better model can be achieved using a different 
combination of variables. 
 Taking into account the fact that both GDP and unemployment variables were wildly 
insignificant in the initial model, while both measures of per capita disposable personal income 
were significant at the 10% level, it appears that individuals may assign more importance to their 
own personal financial situations in evaluating economic performance rather than their 
evaluations of broader economic performance (as reflected by GDP and unemployment).  This is 
consistent with basic economic theory that posits that humans are inherently self-interested; 
when individuals feel that they are doing better financially, they will reward an incumbent party 
more so than when they feel the nation as a whole is better economically.  Using this hypothesis, 
and the hypothesis that inflation may be a relevant factor in explaining electoral outcomes (from 
1980 election outliers), I regress vote against incumbency, DPI2year, DPI12, and Inflation.  The 
results appear below: 
                                                                              
       _cons     51.80329   2.255369    22.97   0.000     47.31133    56.29525
   Inflation    -1.633484   .5021084    -3.25   0.002     -2.63352   -.6334487
       DPI12    -.1207379    .503443    -0.24   0.811    -1.123431    .8819556
    DPI2year     1.017541   .3860025     2.64   0.010     .2487499    1.786331
      Incumb    -5.298959   1.839834    -2.88   0.005    -8.963307   -1.634611
                                                                              
        Vote        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5823.96543    80  72.7995679           Root MSE      =  7.5796
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2108
    Residual    4366.26541    76  57.4508606           R-squared     =  0.2503
       Model    1457.70003     4  364.425006           Prob > F      =  0.0002
                                                       F(  4,    76) =    6.34
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      81
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 DPI12 retains its negative coefficient (smaller than the previous coefficient without 
inflation) but is now strongly insignificant.  Incumbency, DPI2year and inflation are significant 
at the 5% level, and inflation has a negative coefficient.  The interpretation of the inflation 
coefficient suggests that every one percentage point increase in inflation in the election year is 
associated with a 1.633484 percentage point punishment for the incumbent party.  This fits with 
theory; as inflation rises, all else constant, real incomes decline and personal finances worsen.   
Thus, inflation has a very tangible effect on voters’ pocketbooks.  This strong impact of inflation 
raises the possibility of an interaction term between inflation and per capita disposable personal 
income.  To explore this possibility, I create the interaction variable DPI2yearINF, which is 
computed by multiplying DPI2year by the inflation variable.  DPI2year is chosen based on the 
insignificance of DPI12 in the model just performed as well as election theory that suggests 
voters take into account recent performance more so than past performance.  DPI2yearINF 
should have a negative coefficient, reflecting the hypothesis that as inflation rises, holding 
income constant, the real value of income decreases, hurting voters’ personal financial situations.  
The results of this model are displayed below: 
 
 All four variables are strongly significant at the 5% level and the model reports the 
highest adjusted R2 (0.2960) by far of any of the models performed.  For context, the next best 
                                                                              
       _cons     46.27949   2.197918    21.06   0.000     41.90288    50.65611
    DPI2year     1.711502   .4122291     4.15   0.000     .8906492    2.532355
 DPI2yearINF    -.1883687   .0332192    -5.67   0.000    -.2545166   -.1222208
      Incumb    -5.833331   1.689335    -3.45   0.001    -9.197227   -2.469434
                                                                              
        Vote        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5823.96543    80  72.7995679           Root MSE      =   7.159
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2960
    Residual    3946.31067    77  51.2507879           R-squared     =  0.3224
       Model    1877.65476     3   625.88492           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,    77) =   12.21
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      81
16 
 
adjusted R2 is reported from the previous model (0.2108).  Higher adjusted R2 suggests a 
reduction in the variance of vote attributed to random chance.  All coefficients are as expected.  
Incumbency remains negative, suggesting that the electorate inflicts a 5.83% punishment on the 
incumbent party after it has held the presidency for two terms or more.  DPI2year is again 
positive and influential, suggesting that voters strongly take into account their personal financial 
situations in the last two years of the term.  The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that a one 
percent increase in the growth of per capita disposable personal income between the third and 
fourth years of the term is rewarded by an increase of 1.71% of the popular vote.  The constant is 
a little below expected (46.27), but the hypothesized value of 50% is within the 95% confidence 
interval.  Finally, the negative coefficient (-0.188) on DPI2yearINF is exactly in line with theory.  
The coefficient suggests that the impact of a one percentage point increase in the inflation rate 
affects the marginal impact of DPI2year on vote by -0.188 percent.  Taking the partial derivate of 
vote with respect to DPI2year, the marginal impact of DPI2year is equal to the coefficient on 
DPI2year (1.71) plus the coefficient on DPI2year inflation (-0.188) multiplied by the value of 
inflation.  Thus, as inflation increases, the marginal impact of DPI2year is decreased. 
 Because this model utilizes panel data, the usual assumption that the covariance of the 
error terms is equal to zero (no autocorrelation) is altered.  Panel data is usually microeconomic 
in nature, and refers to the usage of multiple cross-sectional units (states) that are observed over 
time (presidential elections).  In panel regressions, there is likely to be covariance between the 
error terms over time for the same state, due to the fact that unobserved influences on state 
voting are likely to maintain their effects on the state error terms across time (Hill et al 2011).  
Taking this into account, correlation between error terms within individual states is now assumed 
to be nonzero.  Error terms for different states are assumed to have zero correlation.  The 
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assumption of homoskedasticity is similarly relaxed, as error variance is assumed to be constant 
over each state but different in distinctive time periods (Hill et al 2011). 
 These new assumptions necessitate the calculation of different standard errors for the 
variables in the model.  Standard errors as calculated by ordinary least squares regression 
techniques are incorrect in the face of the assumptions of covariance for panel data.  These 
standard errors that correct the assumptions inherent in ordinary least squares standard errors are 
referred to as “cluster-robust standard errors.”  Each of the clusters is the time-series 
observations (election years) for the individual states.  The results for the final model with 
cluster-robust standard errors are displayed below: 
 All variables remain strongly significant at the 5% level, and p-values change only 
minimally, suggesting that the influence of autocorrelation in this regression is almost 
nonexistent.  Coefficients on the variables do not change, as the new computation only affects 
calculated standard errors.  It is interesting to note that the standard errors of the incumbency 
variable and the constant become smaller, while the standard errors of the other two variables 
(DPI2year and DPI2yearINF) grow larger.  Generally the cluster-robust standard errors will be 
larger than the ordinary least squares standard errors, although the fact that standard errors for 
                                                                              
       _cons     46.27949   1.311548    35.29   0.000     43.25506    49.30393
    DPI2year     1.711502   .4482498     3.82   0.005     .6778362    2.745168
 DPI2yearINF    -.1883687   .0432065    -4.36   0.002    -.2880031   -.0887343
      Incumb    -5.833331   .8374937    -6.97   0.000    -7.764595   -3.902067
                                                                              
        Vote        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 9 clusters in State)
                                                       Root MSE      =   7.159
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3224
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0002
                                                       F(  3,     8) =   24.95
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      81
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two of the variables shrunk is not an issue.  What matters is the significance of the variables, and 
as previously discussed, all variables remain highly significant. 
 The correlation matrix, as well as the AIC and BIC values, is displayed below.  In the 
correlation matrix, it should be noted that the correlation between the DPI2year and 
DPI2yearINF variables is 0.7733.  This correlation coefficient is not surprising given the fact that 
the DPI2yearINF variable is an interaction term that includes the DPI2year variable.  Regardless, 
this somewhat high correlation is not a problem; none of the harmful symptoms of 
multicollinearity are present (high standard errors and p-values, low t-statistics), and all the 
variables in the model are highly significant at the 5% level.  The values of the AIC and BIC are 
552.6411 and 562.2189.  Out of all the models tested so far, this final model minimizes both of 
these values.  The measures of goodness-of-fit (AIC, BIC, adjusted R2) together provide strong 
indication that this is the most reliable model for electoral behavior.   
Further supporting this model are the results of a RESET test (Figure 3) with yhat^2 and 
yhat^3 fitted values.  The fitted variables are both insignificant at the 5% level, and a RESET test 
with only yhat^2 is even more insignificant, suggesting that this model does not suffer from 
omitted variable bias or incorrect functional form.  Finally, this model supports the hypothesis 
that individuals weigh recent economic performance (DPI2year) more heavily than past 
    DPI2year    -0.2073   0.7733   1.0000
 DPI2yearINF    -0.3144   1.0000
      Incumb     1.0000
                                         
                 Incumb DPI2ye~F DPI2year
               Note:  N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note
                                                                             
           .       81   -288.0832   -272.3206      4     552.6411    562.2189
                                                                             
       Model      Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
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economic performance (DPI12), and voters are more concerned about their own financial 
situations (DPI), as opposed to broader economic performance (GDP and unemployment).           
Examination of the residual values of this model display no obvious signs of problems.  
Residuals are plotted against the predicted values of the model in Figure 4 of the appendix, and a 
histogram of the residuals is displayed in Figure 5.  Looking at Figure 4, the residuals appear to 
display constant variance.  Autocorrelation is not present, as previously demonstrated with the 
calculation of cluster-robust standard errors, and a visual study appears to confirm this 
conclusion.  The residuals indeed appear to be randomly distributed around the value of zero.  
Figure 5 provides little cause for concern about the assumption of normality of the residuals.  In 
any case, I compute the value of the Jarque-Bera statistic, which returns a value of 1.0222406 
against a chi-square critical value (at the 5% level) of 5.9914645.  Because the value of the 
Jarque-Bera statistic is well beneath the critical value, I fail to reject the hypothesis that the 
residuals are distributed normally.   
There is a small cause for concern with the nonstationarity of Vote.  A graph of Vote by 
state across time is displayed in Figure 6 in the appendix.  Several of the states appear to be 
displaying possible signs of an upward trend of Vote across time.  Dickey-Fuller unit root tests 
for each state are performed both with a constant and no trend and with a constant and trend 
variable.  For the constant and no trend test, we fail to reject the hypothesis that Vote is 
nonstationary in Georgia and West Virginia.  For the constant and trend test, we fail to reject that 
hypothesis that Vote is nonstationary in Georgia, Ohio, and West Virginia.  These results are 
easily explained; there are merely nine observations (years) for each state, which makes it very 
difficult to trust the validity of any test for stationarity.  In any short period of time, the 
importance of a small trend may become magnified, despite the fact that that trend would be 
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insignificant with a larger sample set.  Additionally, we only fail to reject the null hypothesis in 
three states (out of nine), which is hardly indicative of widespread nonstationarity problems.    
With a larger sample set, the results discussed here would be concerning, but with this small 
sample size, there is little need to correct for possible nonstationarity. 
Conclusion 
 The results from the final model serve as confirmation of election theory that posits that 
voters are more concerned about their personal financial situations, as opposed to broader 
economic performance, and that voters place more importance on recent economic performance 
than past performance in evaluating the performance of the incumbent party.  The model also 
indicates that voters inflict significant punishment on incumbent parties that have held the White 
House for more than two terms.  Finally, the model indicates that the inflation rate, as it pertains 
to the real value of voters’ incomes, plays a significant role in the evaluation of economic 
performance.  The message of this model to presidential candidates is clear: if a member of the 
incumbent party in a time of economic growth, emphasize how that growth is tied to the 
improvement in voters’ personal financial situations. If a member of the incumbent party in 
negative economic conditions - good luck.  Send strong messages about how the party’s policies 
have improved or softened the blow to voter’s financial situations.  If a member of the 
opposition, emphasize how the policies of the incumbent party have hit voters’ pocketbooks and 
stress the need to try new ideas (time for change), especially if the incumbent party has held the 
presidency for two terms or more.  
 As with any econometric model, this model has several problems that are worth 
discussing.  The first problem is the small sample size.  Although this model has more 
observations (81) than the next best model (23), achieved by virtue of state-level data, 81 
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observations cannot be considered numerous.  Unfortunately, this is a problem only time will 
solve; with more presidential elections will come more observations and more accurate results.  
In its current form, this model also cannot forecast, although it does provide interesting insight 
into the determinants of electoral outcomes.  Because per capita disposable income at the state 
level is collected annually, there is a period of time between the early November presidential 
election and the end of the year that is included in the model but not factored into voter 
decisions.  While the impact of this period is likely relatively minor, in order to forecast, there 
would need to be a measure of per capita disposable personal income available no later than the 
end of the third quarter of the election year.  Lastly, the adjusted R2 value for this model is 
relatively low (0.2960), which indicates that there is a significant portion of Vote variance that is 
due to other variables and/or random chance.  Regardless, the highly significant variables in this 
model indicate a relatively well-constructed model. 
 For future research, I am hopeful that a state-level quarterly measure of per capita 
disposable personal income will be developed.  If not developed, I can use annual data to 
forecast quarterly values which will allow me to forecast the outcome of actual elections in 
advance.  An interesting field of research in political science is also underway examining the 
influence of prospective voter behavior.  Most political scientists (and models) assume that 
voters predominantly behave retrospectively in their voting decisions, but I suspect there is a role 
for prospective evaluations of candidates and parties.  Consequently, I would like to develop a 
model that includes a prospective variable along the lines of Lockerbie’s prospective voting 
model (Lockerbie 2004).  Certainly this model would also include a retrospective component via 
per capita disposable personal income or other economic variable.  Finally, I await the passage of 







                                                                              
       _cons    -303.8684   181.9027    -1.67   0.099    -666.0829    58.34612
    yhattfc2     .1581262   .0819659     1.93   0.057    -.0050887    .3213412
      Incumb     41.08914   22.84786     1.80   0.076    -4.406755    86.58504
    GDP2year    -9.831257   5.457721    -1.80   0.076    -20.69897    1.036454
                                                                              
        Vote        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5823.96543    80  72.7995679           Root MSE      =  8.0036
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1201
    Residual    4932.40087    77  64.0571541           R-squared     =  0.1531
       Model    891.564565     3  297.188188           Prob > F      =  0.0049
                                                       F(  3,    77) =    4.64

















                                                                              
       _cons     2749.021   1436.683     1.91   0.060    -112.9982    5611.041
       yhat3     .0126671   .0066522     1.90   0.061    -.0005847    .0259189
       yhat2    -1.846784   .9774743    -1.89   0.063    -3.794013    .1004446
 DPI2yearINF      -16.917   8.937187    -1.89   0.062    -34.72079    .8867897
    DPI2year     153.8486   81.34058     1.89   0.062    -8.190103    315.8874
      Incumb    -526.9598   278.6598    -1.89   0.062    -1082.079    28.15904
                                                                              
        Vote        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5823.96543    80  72.7995679           Root MSE      =  7.0809
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3113
    Residual    3760.48371    75  50.1397828           R-squared     =  0.3543
       Model    2063.48172     5  412.696345           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,    75) =    8.23
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